Master and Servant—Liability of Master for Injuries Inflicted by Incompetent Servant—Respondeat Superior and Original Negligence by McCormick, Edward J., Jr.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 27 Number 1 
2-1-1952 
Master and Servant—Liability of Master for Injuries Inflicted by 
Incompetent Servant—Respondeat Superior and Original 
Negligence 
Edward J. McCormick Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edward J. McCormick Jr., Recent Cases, Master and Servant—Liability of Master for Injuries Inflicted by 
Incompetent Servant—Respondeat Superior and Original Negligence, 27 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 81 
(1952). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol27/iss1/10 
This Recent Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
RECENT CASES
error. Held: Conviction reversed. Such conduct was extremely prejudicial and con-
stituted reversible error. State v. Yoakum, 137 Wash. Dec. 129, 222 P. 2d 181 (1950).
Where a witness denies having made the alleged contradictory statement, a failure
subsequently to prove that it was made is obviously prejudicial. The prosecutor in
effect vouches that the prior statements were made, and thus becomes an impressive
witness to the jury, though the matter is hearsay. Hence such statements must be
proved. Hash v. State, 48 Ariz. 43, 59 P. 2d 305 (1936) ; Thurmond v. State, 57 Okla.
Crim. 388, 48 P. 2d 845 (1935) ; Phila. & R. Ry. Co. v. Bartsch, 9 F. 2d 858 (1925).
Where a witness admits making contradictory statements, the rule is that it is not
error to exclude proof of the making of such statements by other evidence because
such evidence is only cumulative. Qutayle v. Knox, 175 Wash. 182, 27 P. 2d 115 (1933);
Black v. State, 82 Tex. Cr. R. 358, 198 S.W. 959 (1917).
Where the witness neither admits nor denies making the prior statement, the rule
is that proof of such statements may be introduced at the option of counsel, Hancock
v. Bevins, 135 Kan. 195, 9 P. 2d 634 (1932) ; People v. Preston, 341 Ill. 407, 173 N.E.
383 (1930) ; Humpolack v. State, 175 Ark. 786, 300 S.W. 426 (1928), for the reason
that such proof furthers the process of impeachment, and that only an unequivocal
admission should serve as a basis for exclusion. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Har-
relson, 14 F. 2d 893 (1926).
The Washington court is the first court to decide whether, when a witness gives
an equivocal answer, a failure to offer proof is error. The decision is that proof must
be offered. In support of this proposition the court cites only those cases in which the
witness has denied making the statement. From this it appears that the court has taken
the position that an equivocal answer is, in effect a denial. Other courts in permitting
such proof have indicated that such an answer is more in the nature of an admission
than a denial. It is submitted that the latter position has the sounder logical basis in
view of the transparent falseness of such answers as "I don't remember," or "I don't
deny it or confirm it," and that in the instant case the rule governing denials should
not have been applied.
JA3.ms M. TAYLoR
Master and Servant-Liability of Master for Injuries Inflicted by Incompetent Serv-
ant-Respondeat Superior and Original Negligence. The owner of an apartment
house employed a manager who, in the exercise of his duties, employed a janitor.
Thereafter, the janitor became drunk and assaulted a tenant. The trial court expressly
found that this fact was communicated to the manager who nevertheless continued to
employ the janitor. There was no express finding that any information concerning the
dangerous propensities of the janitor was communicated to the owner. However, the
trial court found generally that both the owner and manager were negligent in retaining
,the janitor in "their employ." Shortly after the first assault the janitor assaulted P,
also a tenant. This assault did not occur in the course of the janitor's employment. The
trial court awarded P judgment against both the manager and the owner. On appeal,
Held: Affirmed. Liability of both the owner and the manager is based on original
negligence, not on the respondeat superior doctrine. LaLone v. Smith et at., 139 Wash.
Dec. 152, 234 P. 2d 893 (1951).
Inasmuch as the defendants did not assign as error the trial court's findings of fact,
the decision is undoubtedly correct. Although the conclusion of fact that both de-
fendants were negligent stood unchallenged on the appeal, there appears to be no
justification for such a conclusion insofar as the owner was concerned. In order for
the owner to be guilty of negligence in retaining a dangerous employee, personal
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knowledge of the dangerous characteristics of the employee is essential. RESTATEmENT,
AGENCY § 213. Apparently no point was made by the owner of his lack of such personal
knowledge.
The court's statement that respondeat superior was not involved is misleading unless
it is kept in mind that the case was presented to the court by both sides entirely on the
theory of original negligence. Actually, the facts clearly establish liability of the owner
under the respondeat superior theory. The fundamental rule that a master is liable
for the tort of his servant committed in the course of the latter's employment fits the
facts perfectly. The manager was clearly negligent in the course of his employment in
his knowing retention of a sub-servant who was dangerous to tenants. For that tort,
the owner is clearly liable under the respotideat superior rule. Personal knowledge on
the part of the owner thus becomes immaterial, his liability being based rather on the
tort of his manager-servant. In approaching the matter from the standpoint of original
negligence, P sets himself a more difficult task than the facts required. Fortunately,
he was aided by the trial judge and opposing counsel who seemed to have ignored the
gap in the proof of original negligence of the owner. Failure of plaintiff to invoke
the simple respondeat superior approach probably arose from the specious belief that
the action was based on the janitor's tort which was not in the course of his employ-
ment and hence could not have stood the test of respondeat superior. The owner's
liability, however, actually arose from the separate tort of the manager within the
course of his employment, with resulting vicarious liability of his principal, even
though the latter was not at fault.
EDWARD J. McCoRmicx, JR.
Injunctions--Temporary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order-Right to
Continue in Force Pending Appeal. P, ex parte, requested a temporary restraining
order. The court refused the request because the adverse party was not present. The
next day both parties appeared and after oral argument by counsel, the court issued
an order entitled "Temporary Injunction and Restraining Order and Order to Show
Cause." The show cause order was made returnable on the same date as the trial on
the merits. The trial court held for D. P gave notice of appeal and pursuant to REm.
REv. STAT. § 1723 [P.P.C. § 5-25] and Rules on Appeal 24, 34A Wn. 2d 27, moved
that the court fix the penalty of the bond so that the order would continue in force
pending the appeal. Upon the refusal of the court, P brought this application for a
writ of mandamus. Held: Mandamus denied. "If it be conceded that there was a hear-
ing," it was to determine whether a temporary restraining order and not whether a
temporary injunction should be issued because the order provided that D was to show
cause why it should not be continued in effect. The mere fact that the order was
continued in force until the trial does not make it a temporary injunction. Davis v.
Gibbs, 139 Wash. Dec. 163, 234 P. 2d 1071 (1951).
REm. REv. STAT. § 1723 provides that where a "final judgment" of a superior court
is rendered in a cause "wherein a temporary injunction has been granted," if the party
at whose instance the injunction was granted shall appeal, then, upon proper filing of
a bond, the order shall continue in force pending appeal as a matter of right. Because
the statute refers only to a temporary injunction and does not provide for the con-
tinuance of a temporary restraining order pending appeal, counsel should be certain of
the exact nature of the order he requests and subsequently obtains. The purpose of this
note is to present the distinction between these two orders and to propose possible
solutions to the problem presented by the instant case.
While the court has sometimes distinguished the two orders by purpose, the more
